





UNIVERSITY OF


# Al safety: a box of tricks


Problems and solutions Stuart Armstrong Future of Humanity Institute


# Al is effective at unbounded unfriendly goals.

The problem

(probably)








### **Building safety**

$$R = \min_{\rho} \left\{ \mathbb{E}' \left( \frac{P(g^{\rho} | X, b, O)}{P(g^{\rho} | \neg X, b, O)} \right) > 10, \text{ or } \mathbb{E}' \left( \frac{P(g^{\rho} | \neg X, b, O)}{P(g^{\rho} | X, b, O)} \right) > 10 \right\}$$


#### 4.2 Unsafe output channel

The easiest way to allow for higher impact, is to specifically exclude the AI's output from the reduced impact requirements. For instance, assume the AI is going to send out message O. To ensure that  $P(O|\neg X) \neq 0$ , we set up at alternative system that will produce a random message.

Then we exclude the contents of O from the reduced impact considerations





Lying is default!



What's safe to ask?


- 1) Checkable multiple choice, noncounterfactual.
- 2) Counterfactual questions about expected utilities, probabilities, conditionals, etc...






C. Probability of humans looking into box/follow up questions, etc...

Scoring Oracle Output M, numeric Estimate U>0 Erasure E



 $U^{\#} = (2MU - M^{2}) I_{E}$ M = E(U|E) Conditional on X?





### Value learning Would you want to become a murderer?



Corrigibility: safely changing the Al's goals

 $u \rightarrow v$  $u \rightarrow v + E(u|u \rightarrow u) - E(v|u \rightarrow v)$ 



Value learning What about just "stop it"?

Interruptibility: safe policy change  $Q(s_t,a_t) \leftarrow \alpha Q(s_t,a_t) + (1-\alpha)(R_t + max_{a'}Q(s_{t+1},a'))$ 

 $Q(s_t, a_t) \leftarrow \alpha Q(s_t, a_t) + (1 - \alpha)(R_t + Q(s_{t+1}, a_{t+1}))$ 





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 $Q(s_t, a_t) \leftarrow \alpha Q(s_t, a_t) + (1 - \alpha)(R_t + Q(s_{t+1}, a_{t+1}))$  $\pi_{\text{sarsa}}(s_{t+1})$ 




•  $V(\pi, h_{< t}, r_t)$ •  $W(\pi, h_{< t}, r_t)$ Agent type Value-indifference Interruptibility  $\mu$ -interruptibility  $_t a_t o_t, f(r_t, o_t)].$ •  $C(\pi, h)$ Model-based, Comp rewards Comp rewards Comp rewards consistent self-model  $(r_t, o_t)).$ Model-based. Variant alg, Variant alg. Variant alg. self-model or comp rewards or comp rewards or comp rewards Interruptible for AIXI Corrigible some notions,  $\mu$ -interruptible others impossible Tor's weakly optimal Variant alg, Corrigible  $\mu$ -interruptible or slow-grow  $\theta_t$ AIXI variant Retraining, Q-learning Interruptible  $\mu$ -interruptible or all Q-V Retraining. Off-policy Monte Carlo Interruptible  $\mu$ -interruptible or all Q-V On-policy Monte Carlo Retraining Comp rewards Comp rewards Sarsa Retraining Variant alg Variant alg

 $u_t o_t, r_t)].$ 


**Table 2.** Requirements for corrigibility and interruptibility for various agents.

### Don't do much




### $R = d(P(.|X), P(.|\neg X))$

### Don't do much



# R = d(P(.|X), P(.|-X)) $V_{\omega} \text{ being the variable values in world } \omega$ $R = \max_{\omega} |P(V_{\omega}|X) - P(V_{\omega}|-X)|$

### Don't do much




### $R=E[|P(g|X,b)-P(g|\neg X,b)|]$

### Don't do much – but do some

### $\mathsf{R}=\mathsf{max}_{\omega}|\mathsf{P}(\mathsf{V}_{\omega}|\mathsf{X}, \#\mathsf{N})-\mathsf{P}(\mathsf{V}_{\omega}|\neg\mathsf{X}, \#\mathsf{N})|$






### Don't do much – but do some


# $\begin{aligned} \mathsf{R} = \max_{\omega} | \mathsf{P}(\mathsf{V}_{\omega} | \mathsf{X}, \#\mathsf{N}) - \mathsf{P}(\mathsf{V}_{\omega} | \neg \mathsf{X}, \#\mathsf{N}) | \\ \mathsf{R}_{\mathsf{X}} | \neg \mathsf{Y} \quad \mathsf{R}_{\mathsf{Y}} | \neg \mathsf{X} \end{aligned}$





### My world, my rules

### Al in virtual world W




u: internal utility s: shutdown U=ul<sub>w</sub> + sl<sub>w'</sub>

Challenge to have safe+useful u and W.

### My world, my rules


### Al in virtual world W



#### Testing models to destruction

### In conclusion

### Al is effective at unbounded unfriendly goals.



## (possibly solvable)